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Note
Trust Depreciation Accounting and
the Minnesota Statute on Accumulations
The Minnesota statutory restriction on income accumu-
lations limits the period for which rents and profits from
real property may be accumulated. This Note analyzes
whether this statutory restriction prohibits the establish-
ment of depreciation accounts for trusts holding nonbusi-
ness realty. The author concludes that if the settlor did
not direct any accumulations or if the "judicious manage-
ment" exception is applicable, the trustee may establish a
trust depreciation account. Nevertheless, the author rec-
ommends that the Minnesota statute be repealed.
INTRODUCTION
In order to obtain the advantages of professional management,
a testator who wishes to dispose of income-producing real property
will often provide for the transfer of this realty to a testamentary
trust. Among the advantages which professional management can
provide are collections of rent, maintenance of accounts, and pres-
ervation of the property's income-producing capabilities.' In Min-
nesota, however, the testamentary trust is denied certain potential
advantages of trust management because of statutory restrictions
which are imposed on accumulations of "income" received from
real property.2 For example, the testator's intention may have been
1. See 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 170-85 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
SCOTT].
2. These restrictions are contained in MINN. STAT. § 500.17 (1957),
which provides:
1. Disposal; rules governing. Dispositions of the rents and profits of
lands, to accrue and be received at any time subsequent to the exe-
cution of the instrument creating such disposition, shall be governed by
the rules established in this chapter in relation to future estates in lands.
2. Accumulation. An accumulation of rents and profits of real es-
tate, for the benefit of one or more persons, may be directed by any
will or deed sufficient to pass real estate, as follows:(1) If such accumulation is directed to commence on the creation
of the estate out of which the rents and profits are to arise, it must
be made for the benefit of one or more minors then in being, and
terminate at the expiration of their minority;
(2) If such accumulation is directed to commence at any time sub-
sequent to the creation of the estate out of which the rents and
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to provide the trust remainderman with a gift equal to the value of
the original assets placed in trust. If the testamentary trust consists
of depreciable assets, the testator, as settlor, would normally ex-
press this intention by directing the trustee to establish a deprecia-
tion account. However, contrary to other areas of trust law which
attempt to comply with the settlor's intent,3 the settlor's direction
to establish such an account may be disregaided if the trust assets
consist of real property not used in a "going" business because a
depreciation account is, in some circumstances, an illegal accumu-
lation.4
The purpose of this Note is to determine whether Minnesota's
statutory accumulation restrictions should be applied to trusts
which consist of nonbusiness realty. The effect of such an applica-
tion will be analyzed as it relates to the settlor's intent, the income
and principal beneficiaries' just expectations, and the public's in-
terest. Finally, the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the Minne-
profits are to arise, it shall commence within the time in this chapter
permitted for the vesting of future estates, and during the minority
of the persons for whose benefit it is directed, and shall terminate at
the expiration of such minority.
3. Restrictions on accumulation. If, in either of the cases mentioned
in subdivision 2, the direction for such accumulation is for a longer
time than during the minority of the persons intended to be benefited
thereby, it shall be void as to the time beyond such minority, and all
directions for the accumulation of the rents and profits of real es-
tate, except such as are herein allowed, shall be void.
5. Ownership in case of valid suspension of the power of alienation.
When, in consequence of a valid limitation of an expectant estate,
there is a suspension of the power of alienation, or of ownership, dur-
ing the continuance of which the rents and profits are undisposed of,
and no valid direction for their accumulation is given, such rents and
profits shall belong to the person presumptively entitled to the next
eventual estate.
6. Accumulations of rents and profits of real estate held by trustee.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to the accumulations of
rents and profits of real estate held or owned by a trustee or trus-
tees of a trust forming a part of a stock bonus, pension, retirement or
profit-sharing plan or fund exempt from tax under the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code of the United States, and rents and profits
of real estate held or owned by any such trustee or trustees may be
accumulated without restriction as to time.
3. 2 ScoTT §§ 164, 164.1. For an example of how the settlor's intent
is disregarded when an accumulations statute intercedes, see Minnesota
Loan & Trust Co. v. Douglas, 135 Minn. -413, 161 N.W. 158 (1917).
4. In re Lee, 214 Minn. 448, 9 N.W.2d 245 (1943) (dictum); In re
James Trust, 6 Misc. 2d 849, 159 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1957); see RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 239 (1959); Niles, Trusts and Administra-
tion, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 465, 475 (1958). Contra, Matter of Kaplan, 195
Misc. 132, 88 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Surr. Ct. 1949); see In re Bailey's Trust, 241
Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954).
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sota accumulations statute will be illustrated, and a legislative im-
provement will be suggested.
I. TRUST ACCOUNTING TERMS AND PRACTICES AS
APPLIED TO ACCUMULATIONS PROBLEMS
A. TRUST INCOME
In trust law corpus consists of the property held in trust by the
trustee, and income is the return attributable to that property.5
While this distinction is clear in theory, in practice the determi-
nation of what constitutes income and corpus is often very diffi-
cult.6 When questions of income and corpus allocation arise,
the usual rule is that the settlor's expressed intent should be as-
certained and applied to determine whether specific trust receipts
must be allocated to income or to corpus.' But despite this gen-
eral rule, other factors may intervene to prevent the trustee from
giving effect to the settlor's intent. For example, if the settior di-
rects that income is to be accumulated, the trustee may be re-
quired to disregard this direction because of statutory restrictions
which prohibit certain accumulations.
In analyzing the effect of accumulations restrictions on trust ac-
counting, distributable income must be distinguished from gross
receipts. Payments for current maintenance and taxes, and allow-
ances for depletion of wasting assets are allowed as deductions
from gross receipts prior to the determination of distributable in-
come.' Thus, these payments and allowances are not considered as
deductions from income but rather as trust expenses, and the net
receipts which remain after these expenses are deducted constitute
distributable income. While this distinction between distributable
income and gross receipts may appear to be academic because the
only effect of these deductions is to charge current income with
current expenses, it is relevant in those jurisdictions which restrict
trust accumulations. If these deductions were considered to be de-
ductions from income, most accumulations statutes would render
5. See 3 SCOTT §§ 233, 233.1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 233
(1959).
6. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 12, 164 N.E. 723,
725 (1928) (Cardozo, J.).
7. E.g., In re Bailey's Trust, 241 Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954); 3
SCOTT §§ 232, 233; see UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 2.
8. E.g., Raffety v. Parker, 241 F.2d 594, 605-06 (8th Cir. 1957); Mat-
ter of Haldeman, 208 Misc. 419, 143 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sun. Ct. 1955); Mat-
ter of Davies, 197 Misc. 827, 96 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sun'. Ct.), affd, 277 App.
Div. 1021, 100 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1950). See generally RETATEMENT, PROP-
ERTY § 439 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 233, 239 (1959);
3 SCOTT §§ 233.2, 237, 239.
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them illegal. However, because the statutory restrictions generally
proscribe only income accumulations, these deductions are per-
mitted.9
B. DEPRECIATION ACCOUNTS
The objective of a depreciation account is to provide an al-
lowance for any
loss, not restored by current maintenance, which is due to all the
factors causing the ultimate retirement of the property. These factors
embrace wear and tear, decay, inadequacy and obsolescence.10
While the use of trust depreciation accounts to protect the prin-
cipal beneficiary from this type of depreciation" seems desirable,
the courts have taken inconsistent positions as to whether a trust
can establish such an account. If the trust consists of nonbusiness
realty-that is, assets not used in a "going business"--the courts
have held that the deduction is a charge against distributable in-
come rather than gross receipts.' 2 As a result, a depreciation de-
duction, taken by a trust holding nonbusiness realty, may violate
the statutory restrictions against accumulations. On the other hand,
if the trust realty is part of a "going business," courts have per-
mitted trusts to create depreciation accounts despite statutory re-
strictions which prohibit accumulations.'" This distinction between
trusts holding business and nonbusiness assets, however, cannot
withstand analysis because the relative interests of the income and
principal beneficiaries are identical in both situations.' 4
9. See note 2 supra.
10. Lindbeimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 167 (1934).
11. Basically, there are two types of depreciation-physical and eco-
nomic. See authorities cited Note, Depreciation as a Trust Expense, 4 U.
FLA. L. REV. 41, 42 n.2 (1951). Physical depreciation is the loss of an
object's utilitarian value because of wear and tear, whereas economic de-
preciation is the loss of an object's market value through all causes. Id. at
42-43. This Note is limited to a discussion of trust accounts established
for physical depreciation.
12. In re Lee, 214 Minn. 448, 9 N.W.2d 245 (1943); Matter of Davies,
197 Misc. 827, 96 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Surf. Ct.), affd, 277 App. Div. 1021, 100
N.Y.S.2d 710 (1950).
13. E.g., Raffety v. Parker, 241 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957); In re Bailey's
Trust, 241 Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954); Matter of Kaplan, 195
Misc. 132, 88 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Surr. Ct. 1949); Matter of Nesmith, 140 N.Y.
609, 35 N.E. 942 (1894); Matter of Jones, 103 N.Y. 621, 9 N.E. 493
(1886). See generally Capron, Depreciation Reserves Problem in Trust Ac-
counting, 89 TRUSTS & ESTATES 648 (1950); 55 MicH. L. REV. 857 (1957).
14. Most writers who have criticized the judicial denial of trust depre-
ciation accounts where the trust assets consist of nonbusiness realty suggest
that the courts should follow accepted accounting practices. 3 ScoTT § 239,
at 1857; § 239.4; Capron, supra note 13; Huene, Depreciation Charges
Against Trust Income, 14 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Rnv. 32 (1958); Traver, How
[Vol. 46: 749
The courts have attempted to support this distinction by point-
ing to differences between trust and business depreciation adjust-
ments."5 However, while trust and business adjustments may vary
in practice, they are identical in theory. In trust accounting the
practice is to actually deduct from the cash account an amount
which is transferred to a depreciation reserve fund 6 and adjust
the distributable income and depreciation allowance accounts ac-
cordingly. These are balance sheet adjustments. Generally accepted
business accounting practices, on the other hand, do not provide
for the transfer of specific funds to a depreciation reserve fund.
Instead, depreciation accounts merely represent a bookkeeping
entry. Income is adjusted in order to more accurately reflect the
business' net income as shown on the income statement. This ad-
justment of the income statement affects the balance sheet exactly
as the trust accounting adjustments do. The difference which exists
in the trust accounting practice is the segregation of assets. But
this difference between accepted business practice and trust de-
preciation accounting practice is, under close analysis, of no con-
sequence as the establishment of a special "fund" has no signifi-
cance; it too is merely a bookkeeping entry.
C. ACCUMULATIONS
An accumulation has been defined as the withholding of trust
income from the income beneficiary and the adding of such in-
come to the trust corpus for the benefit of the principal benefici-
ary. 8 Obviously, under this definition the income earned by the
depreciation sinking fund is not an accumulation because this in-
come is distributed to the income beneficiary. In addition, the de-
preciation sinking fund itself is, arguably, not an accumulation be-
cause the fund retains its identity as income-and it is not dis-
tributed for the principal beneficiary's benefit-until it is needed
to maintain the value of the corpus. This argument, however, is
based only on a semantic distinction; the effect of a trust deprecia-
tion account is to deny trust income to the income beneficiary.
Depreciation Affects Distribution of Income from Property Held by Trus-
tee, 85 J. ACCOUNTANCY 320 (1948); Note, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 41 (1951);
55 MicH. L. REV. 857 (1957). However, some writers have suggested that
there really are no "strict" accounting principles. 1 MOONITZ & STAEHLING,
ACCOUNTING 354 (1952); Isaacs, Principal-Quantum or Res?, 46 HARv.
L. REv. 776, 793 (1933).
15. E.g., In re Bailey's Trust, 241 Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954).
16. 38 MINN. L. REV. 681, 682 (1954).
17. Note, supra note 11, at 44.
18. Matter of Hartman, 126 Misc. 862, 215 N.Y. Supp. 802 (Surr. Ct.
1926); 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS § 217, at 399 (1951); RESTATEMENT, PROP-
iERTY § 439 (1944).
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Instead, this "income" is ultimately distributed with corpus. Thus,
the issue is whether this is an allowable or an illegal accumu-
lation.
1. Rents and Profits
A few states, including Minnesota, have limited the application
of statutory accumulations restrictions to "rents and profits [re-
ceived] from real property."'19 However, these statutes do not de-
fine what "rents and profits" encompass. Nevertheless, there seems
to be little doubt but that these terms are synonymous with "inter-
est and income" as they are applied to personal property. A rea-
sonable interpretation of rents and profits, therefore, would in-
clude any money return which a trustee receives from real property.
Under this definition, the statutory restriction covers rental re-
turns, lease receipts, and royalty proceeds.
2. Necessity of Direction
Despite the inclusiveness of this definition of real property pro-
ceeds, this does not mean that any accumulation of these re-
ceipts is prohibited. Generally, the statutory restrictions on accum-
ulations do not restrict accumulations per se; instead, only the set-
tlor's direction to the trustee to accumulate receipts for either an
improper purpose or beyond the legal period is void.2" This di-
rection requirement, however, is met, under most interpretations, if
adherence to the settlor's direction results in an accumulation of
income received from real property.2 For example, if the settlor
directs the trustee to pay a fixed annuity from the income earned
by the trust-which consists of real property-the trustee cannot
19. Three states had limited their statutory accumulations restrictions
to rents and profits received from realty. ARJz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-238(1956); MINN. STAT. § 500.17 (1957); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.37 (1957)
(repealed and re-enacted to- apply to both realty and personalty in Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 230.37 (Supp. 1961)).
20. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 500.17 (1957). Subdivision 3 of this statute
reads:
Restriction on accumulation. If, in either of the cases mentioned in
subdivision 2, the direction for such accumulation is for a longer
time than during the minority of the persons intended to be benefit-
ed thereby, it shall be void as to the time beyond such minority, and
all directions for the accumulation of the rents and profits of real
estate, except such as are herein. allowed, shall be void.
(Emphasis added.)
21. E.g., Hascall v. King, 162 N.Y. 134, 56 N.E. 515 (1900) (payment
of mortgage encumbering trust property); Spencer v. Spencer, 38 App.
Div. 403, 56 N.Y. Supp. 460 (1899) (residue after an annuity payment);
cf. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Douglas, 135 Minn. 413, 161 N.W. 158
(1917) (50% of trust income to be paid out, 50% to be accumulated).
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retain the excess income which is not needed to meet the annuity
payments without having made an illegal accumulation.22 An il-
legal accumulation also occurs when the settlor directs that trust
income is to be used to satisfy a mortgage which encumbers trust
property.2 3 This raises the question which this Note examines: is
the settlor's direction to establish a depreciation account a directed
accumulation which is void under the Minnesota statute restricting
accumulations?
H. HISTORICAL BASIS OF TRUST
ACCUMULATIONS RESTRICTIONS
A. THE ENGLISH APPROACH-THELLUSSON'S WILL
Prior to 1800, the Rule Against Perpetuities was the only re-
striction imposed upon accumulations of trust income.2" As a
result, an accumulation of trust income was valid unless it was
directed for a period in excess of lives in being plus 21 years.25
But in 1800 the English Parliament reacted to the holding of the
Chancery Court in the now famous case of Thellusson v. Wood-
ford;"8 income accumulations were restricted by statute.
In Thellusson the testator created a testamentary trust in which
he directed that the trust's income was to be accumulated for a
period equal to the lives of nine of his sons and grandsons living
at his death.27 This disposition was upheld by both the Chancery
Court and the House of Lords. In response to this decision, Parlia-
ment enacted the Thellusson Act.28 Parliament feared that if it
did not act the "dead hand" would acquire excessive control over
wealth, money would become insulated from commerce and taxes,
22. Spencer v. Spencer, 38 App. Div. 403, 56 N.Y. Supp. 460 (1899);
cf. Hascall v. King, 162 N.Y. 134, 56 N.E. 515 (1900).
23. Matter of Storey, 134 Misc. 791, 236 N.Y. Supp. 518 (Sur. Ct.
1929); Herzig v. Herzig, 140 App. Div. 514, 125 N.Y. Supp. 402 (1910);
Hascall v. King, 162 N.Y. 134, 56 N.E. 515 (1900).
24. Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch.
1779), affd, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H.L. 1805); see 3 SIMES
& SMITH, FUTURE. INTERESTS § 1464 (2d ed. 1956); Note, Accumulations
of Income at Common Law, 54 HARv. L. REV. 839 (1941).
25. Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch.
1779).
26. Ibid.
27. 4 Ves. Jr. at 227-30, 31 Eng. Rep. at 117-19. For a general ac-
count of the litigation and background to this case, see HARGRAvE, THE
THELLussoN ACT (1842); Barry, Mr. Thellusson's Will, 22 VA. L. REV.
416 (1936).
28. 39 & 40 Geo. HI, c. 98 (1800). For a social and economic back-
ground to the enactment of this statute, see LUNT, HISTORY OF ENGLAND
593-614 (3d ed. 1947); 8 ENCYC. BRITT. 527-33 (1949).
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and the settlor's living heirs would be denied their "natural boun-
ty.129
The Thellusson Act's solution was quite simple. Accumulations
could be directed for only one of four statutory periods: (1) the
life of the grantor, (2) 21 years after the grantor's death, (3)
the minority of any person alive when the instrument took effect,
or (4) the minority of any person who would be entitled to the
income if he were an adult. While the original Act has been modi-
fied, its basic rules remain the law of England today.3"
B. THE AMERICAN APPROACH
1. Statutory Restrictions
While Parliament enacted the Thellusson Act too late for it to be
incorporated into the American common law,3 the state legis-
latures first responded to the accumulations problem in 1830 and
eventually I5 states had imposed statutory restrictions on accumu-
lations. Of these, three states adopted the English approach;"
seven states adopted the New York approach which permitted an
accumulation if it was for a minor beneficiary during his minor-
ity;33 two states limited accumulations to the period allowed for
29. The most succinct statements supporting enactment of a statute re-
stricting accumulations can be found in the arguments of counsel for the
widow and children in Thellusson itself. See 4 Ves. Jr. at 280-81, 31 Eng.
Rep. at 143; 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES 286 (14th ed. 1896).
30. The original act was amended by the Accumulations Act, 1892, 55
& 56 Vict., c. 58, re-enacted in the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo.
5, c. 20, §§ 164-66; see generally 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 25.100
(1952).
31. See Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924, 928-29 (D.C. Cir. 1941);
Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 28, § 1 (1961).
32. Illinois adopted the Thellusson Act verbatim, Ill. Laws 1907, § 1,
at 1; see generally Schuyler, Accumulations in Illinois, 44 ILL. L. REV. 49
(1949). Indiana adopted a statute in 1852 based on the Thellusson Act;
however, it only restricted accumulations of interest income from per-
sonalty. In 1945 Indiana adopted the Illinois statute, that is, the Thellus-
son Act. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 51-106 (Supp. 1945); see generally Ashby,
A Suggested Construction of the Indiana Statutes Against Accumulation,
26 IND. L.J. 41 (1950). Pennsylvania adopted the Thellusson Act with only
minor changes. Pa. Laws 1853, No. 304, § 9, at 507.
33. In addition to New York, the first state to restrict accumulations
by statute, N.Y. REV. STAT. (1829), pt. 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. I, §§ 36-40,
the states which adopted the minor-beneficiary limited statute were:
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 4702 (1913) (applied to realty only); MICH. REV.
STAT. (1846), tit. 14, ch. 62, §§ 36-40; MINN. REV. STAT. (1851), ch. 43,§§ 36-40 (applied to realty only); N.D. REV. CODE § 47.0304 (1943);
S.D. CODE § 51.0304 (1949); Wis. REV. STAT. (1849), pt. 2, tit. 15, ch. 56,
§§ 36-40.
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the suspension of the powers of alienation;34 and three states
adopted restrictions unrelated to other provisions.' Despite this
wide divergence in the methods which the various legislatures
adopted, the main thrust of each of these statutory restrictions was
to place reasonable limitations on the period in which trust in-
come could be accumulated.
2. Judicial Limitations-A Developing Common Law
However, the lack of statutory restrictions on accumulations in
the majority of states does not mean that settlors in these states
can direct unlimited accumulations of trust income. In these states,
as well as in states with accumulations statutes, two established
property law rules impose partial restriction on accumulations."6
First, if the directed accumulation is a condition precedent to the
vesting of a gift, the rules limiting the creation of future estates-
the Rule Against Perpetuities or the rule against suspension of the
power of alienation-will invalidate both the direction to accumu-
late and the gift of trust corpus." For example, if the testator
creates a testamentary trust and directs the trustee to reinvest the
trust's income for a period of 30 years (without any reference to
lives in being) at which time the trust is to be distributed, the
courts will hold that this "offends the rule against perpetuities in
that it postpones the vesting . .. beyond the period limited.
. . .Therefore, the whole trust is bad."3
However, even if the gift were to vest in interest within the pre-
scribed period-thus meeting the perpetuities requirement-a sec-
ond rule is applied. Saunders v. Vautier 9 an English decision
followed by a minority of American courts, provides that the
beneficiary of a non-spendthrift trust can prevent the postpone-
34. CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 722-26, 733 (1872); MONT. Civ. CODE §
1160-64, 1171 (1895).
35. Alabama restricts trust accumulations where the trust's only pur-
pose is to accumulate income. ALA. CODE, tit. 47, § 146 (1958); see Hen-
derson v. Henderson, 210 Ala. 73, 97 So. 353 (1923). Louisiana limits ac-
cumulations to the life of the trust beneficiary through the interaction of
two statutes. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9, 1792-94 (Supp. 1961). Nevada only
limits accumulations by spendthrift trusts. NEv. REv. STAT. § 166.150
(1960).
36. See generally Note, Accumulations of Income at Common Law, 54
HARV. L. REv. 839 (1941).
37. Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 50 AtI. 898 (1901); First Camden
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Collins, 114 N.J. Eq. 59, 168 AtI. 275 (Ct. Err.
,& App. 1933). For a general discussion of the effect of the property law
prior to the adoption of accumulation statutes, see 3 SIMES & SMITH, Op.
cit. supra note 24, at § 1463; Note, Accumulations of Income at Common
Law, 54 HARv. L. REv. 839, 840-41 (1941).
38. Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 546, 50 AtI. 898, 900 (1901).
39. 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841).
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ment of his enjoyment of it if he is sui juris and has an indefeasibly
vested interest. Together, these two rules effectively limit accumu-
lations of trust income-the outer limits of which, however, can ex-
tend beyond the period of perpetuities.40 But a majority of Amer-
ican jurisdictions have refused to follow the doctrine of Saunders
v. Vautier. Instead, they have adopted the rule of trust inde-
structibility enunciated in Claflin v. Claflin.14 That is, if the
beneficiary's interest has vested, the accumulation directed by the
settlor may continue unabated for the life of the trust. In these
jurisdictions, then, there is no limitation on accumulations of trust
income if the beneficiary's interest is indefeasibly vested unless
statutory restrictions are imposed."
But the courts in the jurisdictions following the Claflin rule have
not permitted unrestrained accumulations. Instead, the courts
have developed a new rule limiting accumulations to the period of
lives in being plus 21 years.43 This development of American
common law has occurred usually without any awareness by the
courts that a new rule was being developed and without any at-
tempt to integrate this rule with other judicial controls on inde-
structible trusts.
40. For example, if the gift were to vest at the outmost limit in one
then an infant, termination would not occur under the Saunders v. Vautier
rule until the beneficiary reached his majority. For a further explanation,
see Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393, 396
(1934).
41. 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
42. But if all the beneficiaries are sui juris and they agree on a release
of the trustee, an extra-judicial transfer of trust property by the trustee
to the beneficiaries can be made safely. In theory, a merger has occur-
red; in practice, because of the principle of estoppel, there is no one to
protest the action. See generally 3 SCOTT § 337.
43. See, e.g., Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); Gertman v. Bur-
dick, 123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 824 (1942);
Dahlgren v. Pierce, 270 Fed. 507, 515 (6th Cir. 1921); Ramage v. First
Farmers & Merchants Nat'1 Bank, 249 Ala. 240, 30 So. 2d 706 (1947);
Moeller v. Kautz, 112 Conn. 481, 152 Atl. 886 (1931); Wilson v. D'Atro,
109 Conn. 563, 145 Atl. 161 (1929); Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn.
343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924); 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 215 (1951);
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 671 (4th ed. 1942); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 62 (1959); 1 SCOTT § 62.11; 3 SIMES & SMITH,
op. cit. supra note 24, at § 1465; Note, Trusts-Accumulation of Income,
41 MICH. L. REv. 188 (1942); Note, Accumulations of Income at Common
Law, 54 HARv. L. REv. 839 (1941); Annot., 152 A.L.R. 657 (1944); cf.
Note, Future Interests: Trusts: Change in the Permissible Period for Sus-
pension of the Power of Alienation in New York, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 703
(1958). But see Burdick v. Burdick, 33 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1940), rev'd,
Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S.
824 (1942).
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IR. THE MINNESOTA APPROACH
A. STATUTORY BASIS
The Minnesota statute which restricts accumulations of trust in-
come is based upon the New York statute of 1830. While the Min-
nesota statute, like its model, is very restrictive where it is applied,
it only restricts some accumulations of rents and profits received
from real property; accumulations of income received from per-
sonal property are not restricted.4 Because they drew this dis-
tinction between realty and personalty, the drafters of the Minne-
sota statute were apparently more concerned with the specific prob-
lem of the alienation of real property income than they were
with the general problem of the control of wealth. 5
A valid accumulation of rents and profits received from real
estate may be directed by will or by a deed sufficient to pass real
property. The statute provides that an accumulation of such "in-
come" is valid if it commences either (1) when the beneficiary of
the accumulation is a minor then in being46 or, (2) if the ac-
cumulation commences after the creation of the estate out of which
it arises, when the accumulation begins within the time allowed
for the vesting of future estates and the future accumulations bene-
ficiary is a minor.47 In either case the accumulation is valid only
as long as the accumulations beneficiary is a minor.4
If the direction to accumulate complies with the statutory pre-
requisites as to time of commencement but it provides for an ac-
cumulation beyond the beneficiary's minority, the accumulation
will be void only for the period beyond the minority.49 Instead
of being illegally accumulated, this "income" will be paid to the
person presumptively entitled to the next estate-this is usually
the income beneficiary. 0 On the other hand, if the accumula-
tion direction is for an invalid purpose-for example, if the in-
44. MINN. STAT. § 500.17 (1957) quoted note 2 supra.
45. See Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 364-65, 200 N.W. 76,
83-84 (1924); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Douglas, 135 Minn. 413,
420, 161 N.W. 158, 163 (1917); Fraser, The Rules Against Restraints on
Alienation, and Against Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation in
Minnesota, 9 MINN. L. REv. 314 (1924).
46. MINN. STAT. § 500.17(2) (1) (1957).
47. MINN. STAT. § 500.17(2) (2) (1957).
48. MINN. STAT. § 500.17(2) (1957). The time for vesting of future es-
tates in realty is controlled by MINN. STAT. § 500.13 (1957) and is two
lives in being.
49. MINN. STAT. § 500.17(3) (1957).
50. MINN. STAT. § 500.17(5) (1957). See, e.g., Matter of Walbridge, 178
Misc. 32, 33 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Surr. Ct. 1942); Morris v. Morris, 247 App. Div.
751, 285 N.Y. Supp. 633 (1936).
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come beneficiary is an adult-the entire accumulation is void."1
Furthermore, in this case the entire trust will fail if the direction
to accumulate is an integral part of the trust agreement.52
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Although the Minnesota accumulations statute excepts only pen-
sion and profit-sharing trusts from its provisions, 3 the Minnesota
Supreme Court has engrafted other exceptions into the statute.
For example, the court has found that accumulations by chari-
table trusts are valid.54 The court's rationale in support of this ex-
ception is by an analogy to the statutory exemption of charitable
trusts from "any statute or rule against perpetuities."55 Anoth-
er exception to the statutory restriction on accumulations seems
to have been created by the Minnesota court in In re Bailey's
Trust.56 There, the court appears to have adopted a "judicious man-
agement" exception.57
1. In re Bailey's Trust
In re Bailey's Trust" is the leading Minnesota case interpreting
the accumulations statute-especially as it applies to the trustee's
establishment of a depreciation account. The testator in Bailey
created a testamentary trust and transferred his unincorporated
nursery business as the trust corpus. The trustees were directed,
inter alia, to maintain the nursery business, and, in managing the
business, they were directed to deduct expenses and other dis-
bursements which they deemed necessary or advantageous before
they distributed the net income to the income beneficiaries.59 In
accordance with these directions, the trustees established a de-
preciation account for the trust's fixed assets. The income bene-
ficiaries challenged this allocation of gross receipts to the de-
51. See MiNN. STAT. § 500.17(3) (1957).
52. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Douglas, 135 Minn. 413, 161 N.W.
158 (1917), held that a trust would fail if the void accumulation provi-
sion contained in the trust agreement was an integral part of the trust.
53. MINN. STAT. § 500.17(6) (1957). This provision was added by Minn.
Laws 1953, ch. 424, § 1.
54. See City of Canby v. Bank of Canby, 192 Minn. 571, 257 N.W. 52a'
(1934); Y.M.C.A. v. Horn, 120 Minn. 404, 139 N.W. 806 (1913).
55. MINN. STAT. § 501.12 (1957).
56. 241 Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954).
57. Id. at 155, 62 N.W.2d at 837. See 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 846,
850 (1956).
58. 241 Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954). In recent litigation con-
cerning the Bailey trust, the Minnesota court refrained from considering ac-
cumulation questions raised in the briefs and during oral argument. In re-
Bailey's Trust, No. 129, Minn., Jan. 26, 1962.
59. 241 Minn. at 147-48, 62 N.W.2d at 833.
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preciation account because it improperly reduced, in their opinion,
the distributable net income.
(a) The Allocation Argument
The beneficiaries' first argument was that the allocation violated
the trustees' obligation to deal impartially with successive bene-
ficiaries; that is, the allocation of gross receipts to the deprecia-
tion account unfairly favored the remaindermen over the income
beneficiaries.6" The basis of this argument is the rule of construc-
tion that in the absence of a specific direction the settlor is pre-
sumed to have intended that all of the trust's income, as defined
earlier,6 ' will be distributed to the income beneficiaries. This rule
of construction is based on an analogy of the trust income bene-
ficiary's status to the status of the legal life tenant.62 If the law
applied to the legal life tenant were adopted in the trust situation,
the court would not uphold a trust depreciation account because it
favors the ultimate taker over the income beneficiaries. 3 In re-
sponse to this challenge, the Minnesota court noted that a depreci-
ation deduction is a proper business expense, deductible from
gross receipts, according to generally accepted accounting prac-
tices.64 Therefore, the court reasoned, if the trust's assets consist
of a "going" business, the trustees should be permitted to establish
a depreciation account for fixed assets.6" However, this reasoning
of the court impliedly equates trust and business accounting; it does
not give weight to distinctions between an income beneficiary
and the owner of a business. Normally, the business owner is in
60. Id. at 149, 62 N.W.2d at 834.
61. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
62. The relationship of the legal life tenant and the remainderman is
superficially analogous to the life beneficiary-remainderman relationship
contemplated by most settlors because the life beneficiary of a trust usually
receives the total income of the trust with the corpus of the trust going to
the eventual remainderman. See Matter of Davies, 197 Misc. 827, 96 N.Y.
S.2d 191 (Surr. Ct.), affd, 277 App. Div. 1021, 100 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1950);
3 ScoTT § 239.3. Scott discusses this analogy in relation to wasting prop-
erty, but he indicates that buildings should, at times, also be considered
such. Id. § 239.4.
63. Evans v. Ockershausen, 100 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. de-
nied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939); In re Roth, 139 N.J. Eq. 588, 52 A.2d 811
(Prerogative Ct. 1947); Matter of Davies, 197 Misc. 827, 96 N.Y.S.2d 191(Surr. Ct.), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 1021, 100 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1950); Matter of
Ottman, 197 Misc. 645, 95 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Surr. Ct. 1949); see In re Lee, 214
Minn. 448, 9 N.W.2d 245 (1943).
64. 241 Minn. at 150, 62 N.W.2d at 834.
65. Compare Raffety v. Parker, 241 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957); In re
Bailey's Trust, 241 Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954); Matter of Kaplan,
195 Misc. 132, 88 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Surr. Ct. 1949); Matter of Nesmith, 140
N.Y. 609, 35 N.E. 942 (1894); Matter of Jones, 103 N.Y. 621, 9 N.E. 493(1886).
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the position of both the income beneficiary and the remainderman.
As a result, his objective is to accommodate two conflicting inter-
ests: (1) a maximum income return and (2) the maintenance
of sufficient working capital for business operations. In this
situation tax considerations tend to be controlling. On the other
hand, the income beneficiaries and the remaindermen were not the
same persons in Bailey. Hence, the court's analogy to generally ac-
cepted business accounting practices seems to be inapposite. There
is, nevertheless, strong authority for the court's position where the
trust consists of a "going" business.66
(b) The Illegal Accumulation Argument
The income beneficiaries' other objection to the depreciation al-
lowance was that the account resulted in an illegal accumula-
tion.6" The court could have responded, as it did to the alloca-
tion argument, that a depreciation allowance is a proper business
expense, and, therefore, it should be treated as a valid deduction
from gross receipts rather than as an income deduction. Instead,
the court relied on dictum in Gerin v. McDonald69 that statutory
restrictions on accumulations are not violated if the settlor does not
direct the trustee to accumulate income. That is, the court will not
find an implied direction to accumulate if the settlor's directions
are ambiguous. While this conclusion is supported by the Minne-
sota statute," the court's further conclusion that the trustees' es-
tablishment of a depreciation account-because of the settlor's
other directions-will not be interpreted as an implied accumula-
tion seems anomalous. Logically, it would seem that if the settlor's
words can be interpreted to find an implied direction to establish
a depreciation account, they also contain an implied direction to
accumulate.
2. Trust Depreciation Accounting After Bailey
In dictum appearing in Bailey, the Minnesota court appears to
have recognized the "judicious management" doctrine as an ad-
66. Raffety v. Parker, 241 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957); Matter of Kaplan,
195 Misc. 132, 88 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Surr. Ct. 1949); Matter of Nesmith, 140
N.Y. 609, 35 N.E. 942 (1894); Matter of Jones, 103 N.Y. 621, 9 N.E.
493 (1886). See generally Capron, supra note 13, at 649.
67. 241 Minn. at 154, 62 N.W.2d at 836.
68. This result occurs because the Minnesota statute only prescribes
"income" accumulations. If depreciation is a proper business expense, as
the court determined, it is not "income" of the business and, therefore,
does not come within the limits of the statute.
69. 64 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1933).
70. MINN. STAT. § 500.17(3) (1957).
[Vol. 46:749762
ditional exception to the accumulations statute. This seems clearly
implied in the court's comment that "if the accumulations . . .
are restricted to the purpose of preserving the corpus and making
it more efficient for earning purposes, there is no violation of the
statute."'
'r
This exception would seem to apply equally to trusts which
consist of either a "going" business or nonbusiness real property.
In either case a depreciation account would serve the "purpose
of preserving the corpus and making it more efficient for earning
purposes." But the court did not indicate how depreciation ac-
counts would be treated under the judicious management excep-
tion. The court did not relate its discussion of the judicious man-
agement exception to trust depreciation accounting; it also stated
that the determination of whether a fund complied with the excep-
tion's requirements was a jury question.72
Although the court did not fully explain the scope of the judicious
management exception, some conclusions can be drawn as to the
effect of Bailey on trust accumulations of real property income.
First, the trustee may establish a depreciation account for the fixed
assets of a "going" business if the settlor has not prohibited the
creation of such an account because a depreciation deduction is
an expense deductible from gross receipts rather than from dis-
tributable income. Second, a depreciation account is not an illegal
accumulation if the settlor has not specifically directed the establish-
ment of the account. Third, even if the settlor specifically directs
the establishment of a depreciation account, the court will not hold
the accumulation void if it finds that the account is needed for the
judicious management of the trust.
In addition, a reasonable interpretation of the Bailey case could
conclude that depreciation accounts may be established for trusts
which consist of nonbusiness property without violating the statu-
tory restrictions on accumulations. In Bailey the trust consisted of
a "going" business; hence, the court's determination that a depreci-
ation deduction is a business expense-not an income deduction-
logically foreclosed the court's further discussion of trust deprecia-
tion accounts.73 Consequently, the court's discussion of the "di-
rection" requirement and the "judicious management" exception is
superfluous unless it applies to trusts which hold nonbusiness
property. As a result, the Minnesota court's earlier dictum in In
71. 241 Minn. at 155, 62 N.W.2d at 937. (Emphasis added.)
72. Ibid.
73. With the court's finding that the depreciation account was composed
of items that were a proper business expense, the statute would have no
further application. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
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re Lee,74 that depreciation accounts for trusts which consist of
nonbusiness property are invalid, seems to have been implicitly
overruled.
IV. RECENT TRENDS IN ACCUMULATIONS
RESTRICTIONS
A. STATUTORY TRENDs
In recent years the legislatures have tended to limit or repeal
statutory restrictions on accumulations. Three states which origi-
nally enacted the English Act have liberalized their rules, and ac-
cumulations are allowed for the period allowed by the Rule
Against Perpetuities in these states." Of the seven states which
adopted statutes on the New York model, two have amended their
statutes to allow accumulations for the period allowed by the Rule
Against Perpetuities,76 and two states have repealed their accumu-
lations statutes outright.77 Furthermore, no state has added to or
increased its restrictions on trust accumulations.
B. FACTORS AFFECTING THE STATUTORY TREND
1. Tax Considerations
Accumulations of trust income are directly and indirectly af-
fected by present tax laws. An example of a direct affect is the
taxation of distributions of accumulated trust income." However,
this tax merely equalizes the trust tax burden with the tax burden
carried by nontrust entities. Since the trust is not subject to a spe-
cial tax burden for the accumulation of trust income, this direct
tax is not an effective deterrent. An example of an indirect tax
burden is the taxation, in some cases, of transfers of property to a
trust.79 But the coverage of these provisions is not broad enough,
the tax rates are not high enough, and the tax loopholes are not
narrow enough for such provisions to effectively deter transfers of
74. 214 Minn. 448, 9 N.W.2d 245 (1943).
75. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 153 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 51-106 (Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.6 (Supp.
1960).
76. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 42, 61; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 11, 16;
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.14, .37 (Supp. 1960).
77. MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 554.37-.40 (1948) was repealed by Mich.
Pub. Acts 1952, Nos. 6 & 7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-03-04 (Supp. 1960)
has repealed the North Dakota statutory restrictions.
78. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 665-68 (five-year throwback rule);
see CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 742-50 (3d ed. 1961).
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2037 (taxation of transfers taking ef-
fect at death); INT. REV. CODE oF '1954, §§ 2503, 2511 (taxation of gifts,
including those to a trust).
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property in trust-at least when these provisions are compared
with the taxation of nontrust transfers."0 Since the tax laws do not
effectively restrict accumulations of trust income, it would seem
that the tax laws do not support the trend to remove accumula-
tions restrictions.
But the tax laws have another influence which has, accelerated
the trend toward the removal of statutory restrictions on accumu-
lations. States without restrictive accumulations statutes provide
their setflors with advantages which are not available to settlors in
states which do restrict accumulations. The advantage to the former
is that the trust is a separate taxable entity through which the
settlor can achieve limited income-splitting."s For example, if the
income beneficiary is a high bracket taxpayer, the trust's accumu-
lation of income will result in the imposition of taxes on the trust
at a rate substantially lower than the tax rate imposed on ,the in-
come beneficiary if the trust's income had been distributed direct-
ly to him. And, where the trust has paid the taxes imposed on the
accumulated income, the beneficiary may not be subject to further
taxes when this accumulated income is distributed. 2 Furthermore,
when the trust accumulates income, the taxpayer gains, in effect,
an additional exemption which would not be available to him if the
trust were distributing current income.8 3 The desire to eliminate
this difference in treatment would seem, therefore, to be a very
strong reason supporting the legislative trend toward a liberaliza-
tion of statutory accumulations restrictions.
2. Concepts of Property Control
In addition to the unfavorable tax consequences which a state's
accumulations restrictions will create, accumulations statutes also
involve an interference by the state with the settlor's ability, to con-
trol the use of his property after he has transferred it to a trust.
The decision to interfere with the settlor's disposition of his proper-
ty requires the legislature to balance various competing interests.8 1
The settlor has an interest in being able to direct the use of his
property. Trust law generally supports this interest. On the other
80. See Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform,
42 MInN. L. REv. 41, 45 & n.28 (1957).
81. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 733-42 (3d ed. 1961).
82. INT. REV. CODE Op 1954, §§ 667-68. This assumes, of course, that
the five-year throwback rule in § 665 has been avoided. See § 665(b) (1)-
(4).
83. This advantage occurs because both the taxpayer and the trust are
granted personal exemptions. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 151, 642(b).
84. See Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 362-63, 200 N.W. 76, 83
(1924).
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hand, protection of the public interest may require that limits be
established within which the settlor may direct how his property
will be used. Traditionally, two factors have predominated in sup-
port of establishing outer limits on the settlor's discretion, First,
trust accumulations are considered undesirable because they re-
move money and property from commerce. 5 This argument, how-
ever, is based on an erroneous fiction; whether the trustee accumu-
lates or distributes the trust income, he is obligated to place all
trust funds, including accumulated funds, in profitable and prudent
investments.86 Hence, the accumulated property is not removed
from commerce. The second factor is the argument which appar-
ently persuaded Parliament when it passed the Thellusson Act-
if unreasonable accumulations are not restricted, excessive wealth
will ultimately be under the control of the accumulations recipi-
ent.87 The weakness of this argument is demonstrated by the dis-
tribution which occurred under Thellusson's will. At the time of
the testator's death, it was estimated that the value of the ac-
cumulations provided for by the testamentary trust would exceed
£30 million-a sum larger than Great Britain's national debt. But
after 36 years, when the distribution occurred, only £326,000
had been added to corpus by the accumulations."8 In addition,
present tax laws would further restrict such accumulations today. 9
The public interest, therefore, does not appear to require the pro-
tection afforded by strict restrictions on accumulations of trust
income.
3. Ineffectiveness of Accumulations Statutes
When the revisors of the New York statute originally proposed
an accumulations statute, it was included as part of a general statu-
tory scheme intended to limit a property owner's ability to suspend
the powers 'of alienation. At that time trusts were considered
undesirable by the revisors because they limited the beneficiaries'
control over the property.9" However, the legislative attitude to-
ward trusts has changed, and the restrictive controls placed on
85. See Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 280-81, 31 Eng. Rep.
117, 143 (Ch. 1799).
86. 3 SCOTT § 227; 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS § 101 (1951); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
87. Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 280-81,'31 Eng. Rep. 117,
143 (Ch. 1799).
88. LEACH, FUTURE INTERESTS 796-97 (1935); Barry, Mr. Thellusson's
Will, 22 VA. L, REv. 416, 424, 425 & n.19 (1936).
89. See Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror, 65 HIv. L. REV. 721, 727 (1952).
90. Fraser, Future Interests, Uses and Trusts in Minnesota, 28 MINN.
STAT. ANN. 53, 87 (1947).
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trusts have been modified. Furthermore, the statutory restrictions
on accumulations of trust income have been ineffective.
For example, the Minnesota statutory restriction has been inef-
fective because it is limited to rents and profits received from real
property91 and because of judicial interpretations. Thus, in Min-
nesota the only accumulations limitation on personal property
trusts is the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.9" On the
other hand, the statutory restriction of accumulations derived from
real property receipts is easily avoided. If the settlor's real property
holdings are significant enough to warrant incorporation, this pro-
cedure avoids the statutory restrictions because the "rents and prof-
its" will be received in the form of dividend payments which are
personal property.93 Or, the settlor can direct the trustee to sell
the real property transferred in trust; thus, there is an accumulation
of income received from personalty which is not within the
statutory prohibition. The Minnesota court's requirement of a "spe-
cific direction," allowance of depreciation accounts for trusts
which consist of a "going" business, and adoption of the judicious
management exception have also contributed to the ineffectiveness
of the Minnesota statute.
V. A PROPOSAL
As the foregoing analysis indicates, alteration of the Minnesota
accumulations statute seems to be desirable. The present statute
has placed Minnesota settlors in a disadvantageous tax position vis-
a-vis settlors in nonrestrictive states; it has been ineffective; and
other statutes provide adequate controls over the acquisition of ex-
91. MINN. STAT. § 500.17 (1957). Any question as to whether this stat-
ute could be applied to a personal property trust was removed by Congdon
v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W 76 (1924); however, a question re-
mains as to the application of the statute to a mixed realty-personalty
trust. The Minnesota court has never passed on this question, although it
had the opportunity to do so in In re Bailey's Trust, 241 Minn. 143, 62
N.W.2d 829 (1954). In Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2N.W. 814 (1879),
the Michigan court was presented with an accumulation of income by a
mixed personalty-realty trust. At that time Michigan had a statute similar
to Minnesota's. The Michigan court separated the personalty from the
realty and applied the statute to the accumulation from the realty only.
92. See MINN. STAT. § 501.11(6) (1957); Congdon v. Congdon, 160
Minn. 343, 363-65, 200 N.W. 76, 83-84 (1924); Minnesota Loan &
Trust Co. v. Douglas, 135 Minn. 413, 423-26, 161 N.W. 158, 163 (1917);
Fraser, The Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, and Against Suspension
of the Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, 9 MINN. L. REV. 314
(1925).
93. Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924). See
Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879) (dividends received
from stock investments are personalty).
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cessive wealth. Two approaches would seem to be available to the
legislature: either the statute should be amended to extend the
area and period of permissible accumulations or the statute should
be repealed.
New York, for example, recently amended its accumulations
statutes to extend substantially the period of accumulation and to
allow an accumulation for any purpose. 4 Now accumulations
are usually allowed if they "terminate at or before the expiration
of' the common-law period of perpetuities. This legislative change
was probably designed to reverse the "flights of trust business to
the greener fields of Connecticut and New Jersey" and to al-
leviate the "inconveniences inflicted on . . . [those who partici-
pated] in these flights."95 If Minnesota were to adopt this provi-
sion, a settlor could validly direct the establishment of a deprecia-
tion account for the trust's fixed assets regardless of whether the
real property is part of a "going" business. However, in the context
of the present tax laws it is questionable whether any restrictions
should be applied to accumulations of trust income.
For example, if the Minnesota statute were repealed, the trustee
of a trust holding nonbusiness real property could establish a de-
preciation account where the settlor so directed. Of course, if, in
this situation, the trust instrument is silent, this issue would not
be resolved. But this is not an appropriate subject of legislation; in-
stead, it is a judicial question and the answer is dependent upon the
settlor's intent. -
94. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 42, 61; N.Y. PERS. PRoP. LAW §§ 11, 16.
95. Powell, Changes in the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and Ac-
cumulations: A Report and A Proposal, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1196, 1206-
07 (1958).
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